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In 19571 six European counEries 
- 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands 
- 
established the European Atomic Energy Community, generally known
as Euratom. Its task is rrto contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the
member states and to the development of relations with the other countries by creating
the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear indusEries'r.
It thus complemented the role of t.he European Econbmic Community, set up at the same
time to create a European Common Market.
The Euratom Treaty inEroduced the first multinational nuclear safeguards system:
the six signatory states handed over the controls for nuclear safeguards within their own
territory to the EC executive body, the Commission. The Commission, therefore, has the
right to control stocks and the flow of fissile material within the territory of the
member states. 1f an infringement of safeguards is detected, the Commission may impose
sanctions on the persons or undertakings responsible. Britain, Denmark and Ireland
accepted these safeguard measures when they joined.-the EC in 7973.
Application of Safeguards in the Fuel Cvcle within the Communitv
The Euratom safeguard system has been in operation for almost twenty years,
and during that time it has proved its effectiveness. It.s task is to verify non-diversion,
and to maintain control over the use to which nuclear maEerial is put for all non-
military purposes.
Euratom safeguards apply not only to all civil nuclear materials in EC member
sEates, but also to equipment and non-nuclear materials for use in nuclear installations
supplied by separate agreements with non-member countries, if such agreements so require.
In contrast with most other parts of che world, the Community has nuclear
installations of practlcally all .types: gas graphite reactors, light-water reactors,
research and experimental reactors, high-temperature gas reactors, fast reactors and
the related enrichment, fabrication and reprocessing facilities. They use natural,
slightly-enriched and highly enriched uranium and plutonium. In 1976 the Community
had these installaEions:
35 preparation and fabrication plants
71 power reactors
117 research reactors
13 reprocessing plants
211 research cenEres, laboragories, stores, and enrichment plants
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The number of movements of fissile material among nuclear Plants in the
Communlty in t976 was as follows:-
- 
5,OOO for material less than 1 kg of weight
- 
8,OOO for material more than 1 kg of weight
In the same period 568 nuclear packages were imported and 5O8 were exported'
These figures indicate the importance and complexity of nuclear activities
in the Community, io which the Euratom inspecEors have been applying a detailed and
efficient system of safeguards since 1959.
The Euratom Safeguards Department has 115 staff members, of whom about 60 are
safeguards inspectors, drawn from all nine EC member states. They are permanent European
civil servants and are t.herefore responsible to Ehe EC Cormnission and not to their
country of origin.
Accountancy
About 2OTOOO entry lines are processed per month from the 450 insEallations'
Electronic data-processlng 
-has been adopted and the computerized system has considera-
bly reduced the effort foi book-keeping and checking. Inconsistencies are automatically
detected. Euratom controls are based on declarations made by each operator on the
amount and quality (enrichment) of the nuclear materiat being moved from plant to
plant in dynami" i1o, as welL as staEic (inventory) conditions. Fissile material is
measured at the time of entry and exit. InvenEories are taken periodically and
declared by the operators: the Euratom control department checks the declarations and
the measurement Systems of the Operators against one another.
Inspectors take ful1 account of the fact that each installation is linked with
a preceding and a subsequent installation within the cyc1e.
During inspection they pay special attention to pluLonium and highly enriched
uranium at poin[s in the fuel cycle where transformations involve possibl-e losses of
material, such as fuel element fabrication ptants or where some uncertainty in the
amount of material assessed may sti1l exist, such as reprocessing facilities.
To provide a better understanding of the way in which safeguards afb applied,
here is an example of the procedure followed in a generic plant for fuel element fabricatio
Flow verification
Receipt s :
The verificaEion of the input material is done by non-destructive techniques
or by taklng samples for analysis at the same time that conrnercial samples are taken,
and Ly weighing. Quite often the verification of the material has been made at the
dispatching installation. In this case the shipping containers are sealed before dispatch
and at the receiving plant only checks on seals are carried out.
Dispatches:
If the plant proceeds to undertake destructive analysis and weight or volume
measurements of material before the final stage of the fabrication, a direct check of
those measurements is performed by the safeguards inspectors.
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If the plant proceeds to undertake measurements of materlal content in the
ftnished fuel by non-destructive assay (NDA) technlques, Lhe precision and accuracy
of measurement are verlfled by use of reference materlals relating to the production.
Speclal attention is given to the preparatlon of these reference materials, which
must comply wlth the requlrements of the safeguards authorities and also be recognized
by the plant operators as reference elements representative of the production.
In cases where the plant does not undertake NDA measurements and the use of
these techniques ls possible, t,his vertfication ls carried out by the safeguard auEho-
rities using thelr own equlpment and their own reference standards.
Waste :
In this case NDA techniques are used by the plant and checked by the Safeguards
Directorate against callbratlon curves.
TakinF the lnventorv
The date and the procedure for taklng the lnventory, which is done at least
once or twice a yearl depending on the amount and quatrity of mat,eriaL held, have to
be declared by the operators. To enable the Safeguards Directorate to carry out its
veriflcation, a physlcal lnventory list is made available to the Safeguards Directorate.
Thls 1lst serves as a basis for preparlng the overall vertfication plan, including
sampling plans and the use of NDA equtpment.
Increaslng use of NDA tnstruments
In order to increase the efficiency of the veriflcations, Euratom inspectors
are increasingly making use oC NDA technlques. Safeguards Dlrectorate equipment has been
lnstal1ed in several plants and, when approprlate, lnspectors use portable instruments.
To glve some examples:
- 
Ganuna scann€rsrequlpped with NaI and Ge (Li) detectors connected to analyzers and
minicomputers, have been lnstalled ln fabrlcatlon plants and are used to measure
fuel elements and plates of enrlched uranlum and pl.utonlum pins.
- 
A trRandom Drivertr is used for active or passlve neutron measurements of uranium and
plutonlum scraps.
- 
An instrument, based on neuEron interrogatlon, has been installed in a fabrication plant
to measure HTR fuel pebbles.
- 
Portable 256-channel analyzers and Sam 2 equipment are used to measure different mat.erlal
quantities through their emission of garunas and neutrons.
- 
Neutron coincldenee counters for the control of plutonium scraps and mixed U-Pu pins
are ln some cases lnstalled ln the plants, others are brought lnto the plants by a
specially equtpped carrier, which is also the property of the Safeguards Directorate.
- 
I mintcomputer is used, ln particular to verLfy the physical inventory taken by the
plant operators.
In applytng safeguards, the choice of points ln the fuel cycle, the selection
rf polnts ln the plants and the type of lnstrumentation most suitable for each application
requlre thorough analysls of the fuel cycle ln general and its components, as well as
careful study of the equipment requlred ln each case and selectlon of technlques to be
used.
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For every situation, the effectiveness and accuracy of safeguards must be
assured, while keeping costs and burdens for the operator to a minimum. A R&D programne
has been developed by the Conrnisslon's Joint Research Centre, together with special
support activities deslgned to solve specific problems that may be encountered by the
Safeguards Dlrectorate during its normal safeguards activities.
Euratom 
- 
IAEA Agreement
In Aprl1 1973, the Conrnunity, seven of its member states (*) and the IAEA
signed a safeguards agreement, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. This agreement is in force and the Euratom and IAEA safeguards
organizations are harmonizing their activities so that the duties and responsibiLities
of each can be properly carried out.
Under the EC-IAEA Agreement the inventory of nuclear materials in the
slgnatory EC member states as of 28 February 1977 has been transmitted to the IAEA,
which is now regularly informed of all nuclear material stocks and movements into
and out of installations in these EC states. Since then many IAEA inspections for
verification of the initial inventory and for design lnformation verlfication have
been carrled out at the same time as Euratom inspections were performed. As a result
of the double checks of Euratom and the IAEA, the Conrmunity is the most highl.y safe-
guarded region in world. Studies are under way, based on Euratomrs knowledge and
experd.ence in applying safeguards, to determLne the best techniques and procedures for
future routine application. Confidence exists that the Conrnunity and non-EC countries
can develop an efficient method of working together in nuclear safeguards.
(*)The United Kingdom voluntarily signed a verificatlon agreement with Euratom and the
IAEA on 7 September 1976, even though it is a nuclear weapons state. France, although
not a signatory of the NPT, is nevertheless subJect to Euratom safeguards and, moreover,
has conunitted itself to negotiations with Euratom and the IAEA on an eventual verifi-
cation agreement.
